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Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncing a
Comprehensive Economic Theory of
Crime and Punishmentt
WILLIAM L. BARNES, JR.

The economic analysis of law has produced a great bounty in a number of
fields, including those of tort, contract, and property law, among others.'
However, the economic analysis of the criminal law has failed to gain the same
widespread acceptance, and has not entered the "mainstream of legal
scholarship." 2 Since Gary Becker's seminal article,3 various scholars have either
endeavored to resolve the economic model's inherent inconsistencies4 or have
rejected the model entirely.' While I tend to side with those who reject the
economic model, the purpose of this Note is not to suggest that law and
economics scholars wholly refrain from commenting on the criminal law.6 Rather,
in discussing the limits of the economic model as a useful tool for enhancing our

t © 1999 William L. Barnes, Jr.
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1995,
University of Houston. I would especially like to thank Professor Kenneth Dau-Schmidt for his
helpful and encouraging comments and insights, and for his instruction of the class, Seminar
in Law and Economics, from which I gleaned many ideas for this Note. I would also like to
acknowledge the text used in the seminar which also inspired many of the ideas for this Note:
KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS ANTHOLOGY (1998).

1. Indeed, the body of work related to the various issues in these areas is so vast and rich
that to cite all these works would be virtually impossible. For a general discussion of an
economic analysis of various bodies of law (including the criminal law), see RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). See also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (1988).

2. Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 289, 289-90 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985); see also Jules L.
Coleman, Crimes, Kickers, and TransactionStructures, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
supra,at 313, 313.
3. Gary S. Becker, Crime andPunishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169
(1968).
4. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the CriminalLaw as a
Preference-ShapingPolicy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1; Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the
CriminalLaw, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985).
5. One author's characterization of critics' arguments against the economic analysis of the
criminal law is particularly cogent:
The reason there is a debate among scholars about deterrence is that the
socially imposed consequences of committing a crime, unlike the market
consequences of shopping around for the best price, are characterized by delay,
uncertainty, and ignorance. In addition, some scholars contend that a large
fraction of crime is committed by persons who are so impulsive, irrational, or
abnormal that even if there were no delay, uncertainty, or ignorance attached to
the consequences of criminality, we would still have a lot of crime.
JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 118 (rev. ed. 1983).
6. Some critics of the economic analysis of criminal law have so suggested. Jules
Coleman, for instance, states that "[a] purely economic theory of crime can only impoverish
rather than enrich our understanding of the nature of crime." Coleman, supra note 2, at 326.
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understanding of the criminal law, I hope to define more precisely the benefits of
an economic analysis of crime and punishment. As Professor Klevorick has noted,
"[s]trengths sometimes appear more clearly when inherent limitations are
recognized." 7
In Part I of this Note, I will first outline the competing theories of utilitarianism
and retributivism, the doctrines that academic commentators have traditionally
employed in their attempts to explain the existence of crime and the justifications
for criminal punishment. Against this broad background I will contrast the
relatively narrow focus of most law and economics scholars who comment on
crime and punishment. I will argue that by basing their analyses primarily on only
a small part of the traditional framework-deterrence, which is itself merely a
sub-category of the utilitarian theory-law and economics scholars have limited
the effectiveness of their positive models of the criminal law.
Part II will take a closer look at some law and economics scholars' theories of
crime and punishment. Specifically, I will examine Becker's discussion of
optimal allocation of resources in law enforcement,9 Posner's economic analysis
of substantive criminal law,'0 and Dau-Schmidt's alternative view of the criminal
law as a preference-shaping policy." I will demonstrate that these authors indeed
presuppose deterrence to be the primary theory or goal underlying the criminal
law, and that the failure to account for competing theories impoverishes their
analyses. I will then examine some additional assumptions made by law and
economics scholars: that behavior can be best explained by assuming that people
weigh the costs and benefits of any action and choose the action that provides the
greatest utility (the "rational actor" assumption); and that an economic analysis
provides a complete explanation of any field of law (the "universality"
assumption). I will show that these assumptions are particularly ill-suited to an
analysis of criminal law, and that they, like the deterrence assumption, detract
from the usefulness of the economic theory. The assumption of actors'
preferences 2 will also be explored, in an attempt to discover whether DauSchmidt resolved any of the problems of the economic analysis of the criminal
law in his alternative view of the criminal law as a preference-shaping policy.
Finally, in Part III, I will offer some suggestions that might improve the
effectiveness of the economic model of criminal law. Most importantly, I will
suggest that law and economics scholars recognize and account for all of the
competing values in the criminal law and understand the varying extent to which
these values are present for different categories - of crime. Applying my
suggestions, I will revisit Becker's social loss function, and show how different
categories of crime might be analyzed, depending on the values associated with
each category of crime.

7. Klevorick, supra note 2, at 290.
8. See John Rawls, Two Concepts ofRules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
9. Becker, supra note 3.
10. POSNER, supranote 1, at 163-77; Posner, supra note 4.
11. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 4.
12. That is, whether actors' preferences are exogenous or endogenous to the "market" of
crime. See id. at 9-17.
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I. TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF CRIMINAL LAW

The criminal law seems to occupy a position of great importance for many
Americans. The public's right of access to criminal trials is guaranteed by the
Constitution; 3 many criminal trials have been well-publicized and sharply
divisive in public debate;' 4 and criminal law and trials are the subjects of
numerous television dramas, movies, and works of literature. This social
awareness is sparked in part by the competing values born of the robust history
of the American criminal law. 5 At its founding, American penal justice was
influenced by prevailing social theory, which disfavored revenge-based
punishment. American penitentiaries of the 1820s enjoyed world renown as an
"experiment" in which the purpose behind incarceration had shifted from
"exacting revenge upon the convicts' bodies to reforming the convicts' souls."' 6
Yet despite this progressive flavor to American criminal justice, primal
vengeance 17 as ajustification for the criminal sanction has never been completely
abandoned. Ideas about the nature of the criminal law and the justifications for
the state to punish its citizens"8 have vacillated over the years, but have
consistently been drawn from one of two broad categories: utilitarianism and
retributivism.'9
A. Utilitarianism
American criminal law today is largely the creation of European reformers of
the late eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries who advocated an end to the
arbitrary "justice" of the time in favor of milder, more regular, swifter, and more
certain penalties. Two of the most notable utilitarian advocates of that era were

13. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980).
14. A few recent examples of well-publicized criminal trials involve the following
defendants: O.J. Simpson, Timothy McVeigh, and Terry Nichols. See Official Transcript of
Jury Verdict, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 704381 (Cal. Super. Oct. 3,
1995); United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998) (providing factual
background for Oklahoma City bombing trial).
15. For a discussion of the history of criminal law in America, with a focus on the novel
ideas of rehabilitation in the American penal system, see generally DAvID J.ROTHMAN, THE
DIscovERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971).
16. Id at 79.

17. For a discussion of the economic role of vengeance in primitive societies, see RIcHARD
A. POSNER, THE EcoNoMIcs OF JusTIcE (1981). Posner attempts to explain the decline of
vengeance in society from an economic standpoint; that is, in modem society, the benefits of
retaliation do not outweigh the costs. Id. at 209. This Note takes the position, however, that
revenge and retribution still play an important role in our society (though unlike personal
revenge in primitive societies, the revenge we exact today is vicarious, through the criminal
justice system). See infra text accompanying notes 58-74.
18. Jeremy Bentham recognized that one of the evils of every penal law was that of state
coercion. JEREmY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 323 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard

Hildreth trans., 1931). Perhaps all scholars endeavoring to explain the criminal law are, in a
sense, attempting to find justifications for the state to exert extreme power over its citizens.
19. See Rawls, supranote 8, at 5.
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Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham.2" The utilitarian view, in general, holds
that "if punishment can be shown to promote effectively the interests of society
it is justifiable, otherwise it is not."'" Past conduct is not a relevant consideration
in deciding how to treat a criminal, and punishment is justifiable only if it can be
shown to be an effective instrument of maintaining, or even shaping, social
order.22 Three specific utilitarian goals that commentators have defined are
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation23 (though it has been argued that
incapacitation may also ring with a retributivist timbre24).
1. General Deterrence
When a criminal is apprehended, of course, it is already too late to deter that
criminal from committing that particular crime. However, by punishing the
criminal and making society at large aware of the punishment, members of society
will be discouraged from engaging in that activity, lest they be caught and
subjected to the same punishment.' This is known as general deterrence.26
Additionally, as will be discussed below,27 the criminal who was apprehended can

20. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963)
(arguing for moderate but regular penalties sufficient only to deter, and arguing against
excessive penalties as being contrary to the interests of society and the rights of its members);
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
(1789), reprinted in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM I (John Bowring ed., 1962)

(hypothesizing a systematic theory of the law-that laws should take form in legislatively
enacted codes which aim to achieve the greatest happiness for the largest number of people).
Social commentators noted the spread of these authors' utilitarian theories across the Atlantic.
See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLF, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 104-05 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., Perennial Library 1988) ("In the Middle Ages, it being very difficult to catch
criminals, when the judges did seize a few they often inflicted terrible punishments on these
unfortunates ....
[B]y making justice both more sure and milder, it has also been made more
effective.").
21. Rawls, supra note 8, at 5.
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., Stanley E. Grupp, Introduction,in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 3, 6-8 (Stanley
E. Grupp ed., 1971); WILSON, supra note 5, at 145-61.

24. Although giving longer sentences to either very dangerous criminals or to repeat
offenders may reduce the level of crime in the "outside world," in-prison crime actually
increases as a result of "incapacitating" such offenders. Since society tolerates this increase in
crime, some have argued that society discounts the seriousness of in-prison crimes and feels
that criminals deserve less protection from crime. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes
as ArationalPunishment,43 BUFF. L. REv. 689, 710 (1995).
25. See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 18, at 337.
26. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE &PHILP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY

3 (1990).
27. See infra Part I.A.2.

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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be specifically deterred" from engaging in that crime, or any crime, through
rehabilitation"' or incapacitation."
Of any theory of crime and punishment, that of general deterrence has been the
most embraced by law and economics scholars." There is some support for the
propositions for which general deterrence stands-that the certainty and severity
of punishment correlate to the level of crime committed.32 However, the theory
of general deterrence has also been roundly criticized, with commentators
observing that the theory is hampered by such realities as legislatures' and
criminals' imperfect information, and by the apparent oxymoron created by
hypothesizing a criminal "rational actor."33 Some sociological studies suggest that
attempts at general deterrence are a waste of resources, because crime may be a
necessary by-product of our society.34 Other critics, increasingly dissatisfied with
the justice and prison systems, claim that general deterrence (and rehabilitation,
discussed below) have not been, nor can be, successfully accomplished in
America.35 As a result of this widespread criticism of general deterrence, there

28. See BRAITHWArrE & PETTIT, supra note 26, at 3.
29. See id.; see also BENTHAM, supra note 18, at 338-39.
30. See WILSON, supra note 5, at 145; see alsoBENTHAM, supra note 18, at 339 ('Taking

away the power of doing injury.-It is much easier to obtain this end than [to rehabilitate the
criminal].") (emphasis omitted).
31. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 4, at 5 (arguing that the purpose of the criminal
sanction is to deter certain behavior by shaping both opportunities and preferences); Posner,
supranote 4, at 1196 (arguing the purpose of criminal law is to deter criminals from bypassing
markets). Shavell provides perhaps the most striking example of a monolithic view that
deterrence is the overriding goal of the criminal law. He argues that while there may be some
"undeterrable crimes" such as beneficial crimes and those involving "uncontrollable rage," that
such crimes, given perfect information, would not be punished. Steven Shavell, CriminalLaw
and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent,85 COLuM. L. REV. 1232,

1242-44.
32. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich, On the Usefulness of ControllingIndividuals:An Economic
Analysis ofRehabilitation,Incapacitation,and Deterrence,71 AM. ECON. REv. 307 (1981).

33. See supra note 5.
34. Indeed, a sociologist would have an entirely different view of the "optimal level of
crime" in society than does the law and economics scholar. Sociologists argue that crime is
simply society's way of handling deviant behavior, and that both deviant behavior and the need
to ostracize deviants will always exist; thus, crime will always exist regardless of any policy
we have on crime. See generally CRIME AND DEVIANCE: A CoMPARATrvE PERSPECTIVE

(Graeme R. Newman ed., 1980) (presenting a variety of perspectives to crime which posit the
inevitability of criminal behavior). In other words, crime will always exist despite all our best
efforts; in fact, it exists because of our best efforts. Arguably, the simplest way to eliminate
crime is to eliminate laws defining crimes. That we have a need to outlaw certain acts,
especially consensual acts with no external costs (so-called paternalism, which troubles
economists) says much about our society. If crime is truly a by-product of our society and will
always exist, then attempts at deterrence and rehabilitation are both futile and wasteful.
35. See BRArrHwArrE & PETTT, supranote 26, at 3-5; ELLIOTT CURRIE, CONFRONTING
CRIME: AN AMERICAN CHALLENGE 236 (1985).
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has been a reawakening of retributivist attitudes36 in most (the law and economics
scholars being the notable exception) who seek justifications for the criminal law.
2. Rehabilitation and Incapacitation
Rehabilitation is the theory that some evil influence causes a criminal to stray
from social norms and break the law, and that proper punishment can cure the
criminal of these evil tendencies." Incapacitation, on the other hand, holds that
certain criminals should be "kept off the streets" because they can do no harm, at
least to society-at-large, while in prison.38 Of course, buried within this latter
theory are questions of whether, and how much, the well-being of prisoners
matters.39 Is a murderer really incapacitated if he murders other prisoners while
behind bars?
These utilitarian theories of specific deterrence have received less attention
from scholars of the economic analysis of law than has that of general
deterrence, ° perhaps because such theories are at odds with the "rational actor"
assumption made by economists. 4' According to economists professing this
assumption, although valuations of different choices may vary, each "actor" will
value costs and benefits and make a choice, given all the circumstances, that the
actor perceives as providing the greatest utility.42 With regard to the theory of

36. See BRAITHWAr1E & PErTIT, supranote 26, at 2-7. The authors discuss the "flight to
retributivism" after the "deterrence literature... failed to produce the expected evidence that
more police, more prisons, and more certain and severe punishment made a significant
difference to the crime rate," and cite criticisms that utilitarians deny "the human dignity of
offenders by treating them as determined creatures whose behavior could not be accounted for
by their own choices to break the law." Id. at 3-4.
37. See BENTHAM, supra note 18,at 338-39. The concept of rehabilitation is expansive. It
can refer to "moral reformation" of the criminal, Markus Dirk Dubber, The Right to Be
Punished:Autonomy andIts Demise in Modern PenalThought, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 113, 143

(1998); to the training of the criminal in some skill or trade so that the criminal would no
longer rely on criminal activity as a livelihood, see Tiffany Zwicker Eggers, The "Becca Bill"
Would Not Have Saved Becca: Washington State's Treatmentof Young Female Offenders, 16
LAW &INEQ. J.219,

255 (1998); or even to "scar[ing]" the criminal "straight," George Fisher,

The Birth of the PrisonRetold, 104 YALE L.J. 1235, 1278 (1995). The common goal of any

type of rehabilitation is to change the behavior of a specific individual.
38. See WILSON, supra note 5, at 145-6 1. Comparing incapacitation to general deterrence
and rehabilitation, Wilson states that unlike those two theories that require certain assumptions
about human nature, incapacitation "works by definition: Its effects result from the physical
restraint of the offender and not from his subjective state." Id However, Wilson also recognizes
that for incapacitation to be successful in a larger sense, three conditions must be present in
society: that some criminals are repeat offenders, that offenders taken off the streets are not
immediately replaced by new recruits, and that prisons are not "schools of crime." Id. at 14647.
39. See Dubber, supra note 24,at 710.
40. But see Ehrlich, supranote 32.
41. That is, individuals are rational utility maximizers. For a discussion of this and other
simplifying assumptions made by economists, see A. MITCHELL POLINsKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND ECONOMICs 7-10 (2d ed. 1989).
42. See COOTER & ULEN, supranote 1, at 11, 16-17.
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general deterrence, those individual differences in valuation of choices can easily
be accounted for. The punishment must involve penalties that exceed the
maximum expected valuation of utility gained from the commission of the crime
sought to be deterred, plus, as many economists have stated, some "kicker" that
either compensates society for the costs of catching the criminal or acts as an
additional negative incentive to the criminal for having avoided the market.43
However, the assumption of the rational actor seems to have little application
to the theories of specific deterrence, in part because of the nature of general
deterrence and the interplay between general and specific deterrence. General
deterrence focuses on the aggregate of criminal behavior, while specific
deterrence focuses on individual criminals. Criminal law as a general deterrent
is a device" that presupposes the existence of prior criminal activities. In other
words, in order for would-be criminals to be deterred, some crime must have
already been committed, and some punishment already meted out, so that the
threat of punishment is not empty.45 Presumably, this perceived threat of
punishment will deter those who would have engaged in crime but for the threat
of punishment-for them, the increased cost of crime renders the criminal
transaction inefficient from their point of view.46
One of the shortcomings of general deterrence is that it does not adequately
provide for the fate of those individuals who, as part of the general deterrence
mechanism, must be caught and punished. Traditionally, criminal law scholars
have recognized that theories of specific deterrence-rehabilitation and
incapacitation-complement general deterrence by focusing on the concerns of
the individual criminal. But is there any room for these theories under an
economic analysis?47 How does one reconcile, for example, the theory of
rehabilitation with the assumption of the rational actor-why would a rational
actor stray from the path of rationality and decide to commit the crime anyway,
assuming that optimal penalties, including the "kickers," have been discovered
and implemented?4"

43. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1126 (1972); see also
Posner, supranote 4, at 1203.
44. Indeed, this has been another of the many criticisms of general deterrence-that it uses
convicts as tools to promote the ends of society. See Rawls, supra note 8, at 15. A larger,
related criticism of all utilitarian goals has been that "instead of holding [criminals] responsible
for their wrongdoing, [utilitarian preventionists] sought to manipulate them by curing their
sickness (rehabilitation), changing the reward-cost calculations that determined their offending
(deterrence), and keeping them away from criminal opportunities (incapacitation)."
BRArrHWArrE & Prrr,supra note 26, at 4 (parentheticals in original).
45. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 210-11.
46. See Posner, supranote 4, at 1203-04.
47. See Ehrlich, supranote 32, at 311. Ehrlich argues that deterrence attempts to change
the "price of crime" for potential criminals, while rehabilitation attempts to remove criminals
from the market of crime. Id, While Ehrlich does involve the concept of rehabilitation in a
certain type of economic analysis (thus answering the question of whether there "is any room
for these theories under an economic analysis"), he does not specifically address the problems
of a "rational actor" assumption at the level of individual decisions.
48. See Becker, supra note 3, at 180, 201-04.
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Perhaps one could argue that the criminal could be "rehabilitated" in the sense
that the criminal's imperfect information 49 could be cured through punishment.
That is, the actor committed the crime only because the actor did not possess all
of the information regarding the chances of being caught and subjected to
punishment. This lack of information in turn led to an incorrect valuation of costs
and benefits. Consequently, the actor rationally (albeit mistakenly) decided to
commit the crime.
This explanation, besides being at odds with the traditional concept of
rehabilitation, 0 does not account for recidivism, which is present to a large
degree for many types of crime.5' If criminals are rational, and make poor choices
only because of imperfect information which leads to an incorrect valuation of
costs and benefits, then being caught one time should be enough for them to
adjust their cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, for each subsequent time that the
criminal is caught and subjected to punishment, the criminal's information
regarding the true chances of being caught and subjected to punishment should
become incrementally more "perfect." If criminals are thus made aware of the
costs and benefits but persist in criminal behavior because they simply value
crime or the spoils of crime too highly, then they are either irrational,52 or it
would seem patently unfair to punish them under any theory of deterrence.
Because of their values, certain criminals (under a theory of specific deterrence)
or people like them (under a theory of general deterrence), would never be
deterred under the current law.53

49. Perfect information is a simplifying assumption often employed by economists. See
POLINSKY, supra note 41, at 6-11. This assumption, often inaccurate in a strict sense, is
especially troubling in the context of criminal law. See WILSON, supra note 5, at 118.
50. See supra text accompanying note 37.
51. In 1989, the Bureau of Justice issued a statistics report on the recidivism rate of
convicted criminals. Three years after release, 62.5% of the convicts had been re-arrested. See
ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, at 3 (1989).
52. Here, the concept of "rationality" (or "irrationality") may be confusing. When we say
that someone is "irrational" because that person persists in a harmful activity (in this case,
crime), we are imposing our own view of how someone must value crime and weigh the
likelihood of being caught after having been caught many times before. However, many
economists would argue that such valuation must be subjective (that is, from the criminal's
personal point of view), and thus use a definition of "rational" that is based on the criminal's
personal valuation of different outcomes. Indeed, this has been one of the criticisms of law and
economics scholarship in general-that the assumptions made are not valid, yet still
unfalsifiable (because of their subjective nature). See, e.g., Cento. G. Veljanovski, The
EconomicApproach to Law: A CriticalIntroduction,7 BRIT. J.L. & SOC'Y 158, 162-63 (1980).
53. The response of some economists, to salvage the assumption of rational actor, has been
the following: a criminal, having learned further criminal skills in prison, and facing hostile
employers upon being released, "would be irrational if he did not return to crime." Richard F.
Sullivan, The Economics of Crime: An Introductionto the Literature, 19 CRIME & DELINQ.

138, 142 (1973) (emphasis in original). This view, however, assumes that prisons have no
rehabilitative value, assumes that a rational criminal assigns an inordinately high value-to crime
and a low value to punishment (especially considering the increased awareness of the chances
of apprehension), and ignores sociological or psychological factors that may contribute to
recidivism.
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One encounters similar problems when applying the economic model to
incapacitation.54 Wilson argues that one advantage to incapacitation is that "it
does not require us to make any assumptions about human nature."55 Wilson
continues, "By contrast, [general] deterrence works only if people take into
account costs and benefits of alternative courses of action and choose that which
confers the largest net benefit .... Rehabilitation works only if the values,

preferences, or time-horizons of criminals can be altered by plan."56 However,
contrary to Wilson's view, implicit in the assertion that a particular criminal must
be specifically deterred by incapacitation is the assertion that the criminal cannot
be deterred any other way. That is, the criminal is not a rational actor subject to
general deterrence, and cannot be rehabilitated.
B. Retributivism
The law is replete with retributivist influences, including the lex talionis of
Early Roman law, the "eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth" concept found in the Old
Testament, and the influential writings of the philosopher Immanuel Kant."8
Retributivism generally holds that the reason to punish is desert-wrongdoing
merits punishment, and punishing a wrongdoer is good, irrespective of any
consequences of punishing that wrongdoer.5 9 However, because of the prevalent

54. Although the traditional type of economic analysis of criminal law does not seem to
lend itself to the theory of incapacitation, there have been attempts to quantify behavior and,
in essence, describe the conditions under which it is "rational" to selectively incapacitate
individuals. In the Rand Study, Peter Greenwood discovered seven factors, that, taken together,
are highly predictive of a high-rate offender: the offender (1) was convicted as a juvenile
(before 16); (2) used illicit drugs as ajuvenile; (3) used illicit drugs during the previous two
years; (4) was employed less than 50% of the time during the previous two years; (5) served
time in a juvenile facility; (6) was incarcerated in prison more than 50% of the time over the
previous two years; and (7) was previously convicted for the present offense. PETER W.
GREENWOOD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION 50 (1982). When these
factors are present, it is arguably rational from a societal point of view to apply the theory of
incapacitation and to give such offenders longer sentences. In addition to such "personspecific" criteria for predicting recidivism, studies have identified rates for certain types of
crimes and categories of crimes. See BECK& SHPLEY, supra note 51, at 6. Other "economi"
studies involving incapacitation dealing with societal allocation of resources have been
motivated by scarce prison resources. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS,
INCAPACrrATION 131-33 (1995).
55. WILSON, supranote 5, at 145.

56. Id.
57. One recent example of society deciding that certain individuals cannot be deterred or
rehabilitated is found in civil commitment statutes for sex offenders. The Supreme Court
recently affirmed the validity of a Kansas statute that provided for civil commitment of sex
offenders after the penal sentence had been served. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997).
58. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 208; IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195
(W. Hastie trans., 1887) ("Juridical Punishment can never be administered merely as a means
for promoting another Good either with regard to the Criminal himself or to Civil Society..
He must first be found guilty and punishable .... .") (emphasis omitted).
59. See Rawls, supranote 8, at 3-5.
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reformist attitude during the early years of the American criminal system,6"
retributivism fell into disfavor, where it remained until fairly recently. 6' Today,
most criminal law scholars (aside from law and economics scholars) recognize
that there is an element of retributivism in crime and punishment.
Michael Moore, a scholar in the discipline of law and psychology, provides a
useful illustration of the retributivist element of criminal law:
Imagine in such a case that after [committing a brutal rape] but before
sentencing the defendant has gotten into an accident so that his sexual desires
are dampened to such an extent that he presents no further danger of rape; if
money is also one of his problems, suppose further that he has inherited a
great deal of money, so that he no longer needs to rob. Suppose, because of
both of these facts, we are reasonably certain that he does not present a
danger of either forcible assault, rape, robbery, or related crimes in the future.
Since [the rapist] is (by hypothesis) not dangerous, he does not need to be
incapacitated.., or reformed. Suppose further that we could successfully
pretend to punish [him], instead of actually punishing him, and that no one
is at all likely to find out. Our pretending to punish him would thus serve the
needs of general deterrence and maintain social cohesion, and the cost to the
state would be less than if it actually did punish him.62
Moore then poses the question of whether there is anything remaining that urges
the punishment of the hypothetical rapist.63 If there is anything left, that
"something" is the retributivist element to crime.
Retributivism means more than bare revenge. 64 Besides being an affirmative
justification of punishment, retributivism can be a limiting principle. 65 Therefore,
in many cases, punishment guided by this principle may seem more "just" than
a utilitarian approach. For example, if one were a strict adherent to the theory of
rehabilitation, one would want to maintain custody of the offender until that
offender was completely "cured."' If, then, a convict of petit larceny still had not
been reformed after, say, fifty years, she would still be required to remain in
prison until such time as she could return to society free of those antisocial urges
which caused her to become a thief. But retributivism (as a limiting principle)
mandates proportionality of the punishment to the crime, and is at least one

60. See ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 57-78.
61. See BRAriHWArTE & Pnrrr, supranote 26, at 2.
62. MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKNG THE RELATIONSHIP 241

(1984) (parenthetical in original).
63. Id.
64. And revenge may be more complicated than it may seem at first blush, or than is
described in Posner's Economics ofJustice. POSNER, supra note 17, at 208. For example, Jean
Hampton describes the "revenge" element of retributivism differently. "Those who wrong
others... demean them." Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 124 (Jules Coleman ed., 1988). Assailants gain a
moral superiority to the victims, by impliedly (through their wrong) asserting that the victims'
rights are less worthy than their own. See id. at 124. Retributive punishment of the assailant
asserts the "moral truth" that the victim and assailant are of equal moral worth. Id at 125.
65. See, e.g., KANT, supranote 58, at 195.
66. See Rawls, supranote 8, at 15.
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element 7 in condemning such practices as unfair. Indeed, this feeling is so deeply
rooted as to be a part of our constitutional protection against cruel and unusual
punishments.68
Retributivism as a limiting principle may provide a superior explanation, in the
context of Becker's social loss function,6 9 of why extremely high fies and
extremely low probabilities of detection would not be feasible.7" Some
hypothesize that potential offenders' risk aversion, leading to over deterrence of
socially useful incidents of crime, is the primary concern. 7' However, the
retributivist theory is able to account for those categories of crime which
apparently have little or no social value,' to which the concept of over deterrence
is foreign.
These two sides of retributivism-revenge and proportionality-are related. If
one accepts retributivism as a limiting principle (proportionality), one has more
difficulty in denying the logic of using retributivism as an affirmative justification
for punishment (revenge). Still, some may resist accepting that revenge is a valid
justification for punishment. If the objection to accepting revenge as a
justification for punishment is that past conduct should be irrelevant,' such logic
surely fails in the light of the principle of proportionality. If the objection is that
revenge is simply a base vestige of a more primitive society, one might reconsider
74
in the light of different definitions of "revenge," such as that of Jean Hampton.
Indisputably, retributivism plays at least some role in the criminal law, and this
role has been largely ignored by law and economics scholars.
II. THE ECONOMIC

APPROACH TO CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

IN GENERAL

Against this background of general scholarship on the theory of punishment in
criminal law, we can see more clearly wherein the economic analysis of criminal
law fits. As does this general scholarship, law and economics scholarship seeks
to explain the existence and nature of the criminal law. Law and economics
scholarship focuses on the necessity of the criminal law, given the similar
function of tort law.75 Due to the narrow focus of the economic analysis of
criminal law on general deterrence, it provides inadequate positive models.

67. Another element, which law and economics scholars may find more palatable, is that
giving such harsh sentences for small crimes does not deter properly, as criminals will be
encouraged to engage in more serious crimes if they will be punished harshly in any case. See
Posner, supranote 4, at 1207.
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
69. Becker, supranote 3, at 180.
70. See, e.g., POLINSKY, supranote 41, at 78-84.
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supranote 4, at 36.

73. See Rawls, supranote 8, at 3.
74. Hampton, supra note 64, at 125.
75. See Dau-Schmidt supranote 4, at 2.
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A. GeneralTheories
Since Becker's revival of Bentham's theories on the subject,7 6 three strands of
thought throughout the literature have been identified.' The first strand of
thought, "The Optimal Criminal Justice Policy,"" which was the theme of
Becker's article,79 is concerned with a cost-benefit analysis at a social level.
These articles, in an attempt to derive an optimal allocation of societal resources
to combat crime, hypothesize a social loss function. The theory is that if
punishments are sufficiently severe, every criminal need not be caught to produce
the desired deterrent effect that will ultimately reduce crime.8" There has been
debate in these papers about what level of crime is "optimal" to accomplish the
deterrent effect, and whether the criminals' utility (i.e., the benefits of crime
garnered by the perpetrators) should be at all accounted for in the social loss
function."1
Another strand of thought is "The Individual's Decision About Criminal
Activity," which applies to the microeconomic theory of choice under uncertainty
to the decision process of the criminal.82 In these works, the criminal is a rational
actor who takes costs and benefits into account, and allocates time and resources
among criminal or noncriminal activities, according to which will bring the
greatest utility. 3
The third main strand of thought is "The Existence of the Criminal Category.""
This body of work analyzes the substantive criminal law and endeavors to explain
the need for criminal law. Two of the leading articles in this area, one by Posner8 s
and another by Calabresi and Melamed,86 argue that criminal sanctions are proper
for making the costs sufficiently high to discourage criminals seeking to either
bypass market transactions,8 7 or undermine property and alienability rules.88
These articles have struggled with, and failed to adequately explain, inchoate
crimes and the element of intent, both of which seem to elude economic analysis.
Dau-Schmidt, in an attempt to resolve these issues and perhaps salvage the

76. Becker, supranote 3, at 170; see also Posner, supra note 4, at 1193.
77. See Klevorick, supranote 2, at 290.
78. Id. at 292.
79. Becker, supranote 3.
80. See id. at 207; Klevorick, supra note 2, at 292.
81. Since an overarching goal of economists is to maximize the benefits to society, it is
debatable whether one should consider the individual benefits that criminals gain from
committing crime (whether material or otherwise), because of crime's overall harm to society,
which is often difficult to measure against the benefits accrued to criminals. See, e.g.,
POLINSKY, supranote 41, at 84-85; Dau-Schmidt, supranote 4, at 36.
82. Klevorick, supranote 2, at 290-91.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 295.
85. Posner, supra note 4.
86. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 43.
87. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1196.
88. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 43, at 1125.
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economic model of crime and punishment, has proposed that the criminal law is
really a preference-shaping device. 9
One of Professor Klevorick's criticisms of the economic analysis of law is that
these three strands of thought are incomplete and unconnected.' ° On the contrary,
they are in fact related in important ways. Weaving these strands of thought
together, a "comprehensive" economic theory might be enunciated as in the
following paragraph:
All people are rational actors who subjectively weigh the costs and benefits of
many possible activities. Some people choose activities that are labeled
"criminal," because, for those people, the benefits of those activities outweigh the
costs. To deter these people from those criminal activities, the costs of crime must
either be made greater, or the benefits smaller. Costs can be made greater by
increasing either the amount of punishment or the chances of being caught, and
benefits can be made smaller by shaping preferences, so that certain activities
simply are not as desirable. At the same time, however, the social cost of law
enforcement must be kept at a minimum-at the very least, the cost of law
enforcement should not exceed the societal harm prevented by law enforcement;
otherwise, such law enforcement would not be rational, from a societal point of
view, because the benefits would not exceed the costs. Since the cost of crime to
a criminal equals the potential punishment multiplied by the chances of getting
caught,9 the social costs of enforcing the law can be minimized by increasing the
punishment greatly and by keeping low the number of criminals actually caught.
B. Assumptions Underlying the Economic Analysis of
Crime andPunishment
Law and economics scholars make a number of assumptions in creating models
that describe the law. Four of the most-important assumptions made in the context
of the economic analysis of crime and punishment are that deterrence is the
primary function of the criminal law, that individuals are rational utility
maximizers, that the economic model provides a universal and complete
explanation of the criminal law, and that actors' preferences are exogenous (or
perhaps endogenous) to the system of criminal law. An analysis of these
assumptions will further elucidate shortcomings of the economic analysis as a
complete description of the criminal law and punishment.
1. Deterrence
It has been recognized that, at a time when the theory of general deterrence has
fallen into relative disrepute, "[t]he current economic approach to criminology
has reopened the question of deterrence by seeming to make a stronger case for
deterrence than has been made before."'92 However, at first blush, it may not be

89. Dau-Schmidt, supranote 4, at 25-30.
90. Klevorick, supranote 2, at 290.
91. See Becker, supra note 3, at 177; see also discussion infra text accompanying note 94.
92. Sullivan, supranote 53, at 143.
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so apparent that some scholars, at least, base their analyses on the assumption that
general deterrence is the primary goal of the criminal law. Becker, for instance,
purports to argue that his social loss function can incorporate the theories of
'
"vengeance, deterrence, compensation, and rehabilitation."93
Upon closer
examination, however, one discovers that his social loss function itself is
essentially a restatement of the theory of general deterrence. The social loss
function is based upon the relationship: 0 j= 0 %(pjfj, u). 9" In other words, the
number of offenses will decrease as the probability of conviction and the severity
of punishment increase. As discussed,95 this is the principle of general
deterrence-that criminals, as rational actors, will be deterred from criminal
activity when they see that others are being caught and punished. Becker's
underlying assumption, despite his statements to the contrary, seems to be that the
goal of the criminal law is general deterrence. Other law and economics scholars
are more forthright in their view of the goals of the criminal law. According to
Posner, for example, the primary function of the criminal law is to deter people
from bypassing market transactions.9 6
As demonstrated, general deterrence is only a small ingredient in the
hodgepodge of theories advanced by most criminal scholars. 97 Rehabilitation,
incapacitation, proportionality, and revenge are also important factors in
determining proper punishment. It comes as little surprise that economists,
focusing foremost on deterrence, have been unable to produce a model that
adequately explains the criminal law.
2. Rational Actor
One of the overarching assumptions in any work of the economic analysis of
law is that of the rational actor-that an individual, when making decisions, will
weigh costs and benefits and choose the course of action that the actor perceives
as providing the greatest utility.98 As discussed above, this assumption is at odds
with the traditional doctrines of incapacitation and rehabilitation.99 Along the
same lines, the rational actor assumption has been criticized more generally by
those who claim that criminals are inherently irrational00 (though this criticism
probably stems from a misunderstanding of economists' definition of the rational
actor, which is generally so broad and subjective that it is unfalsifiablel"l).
However, the assumption of rationality, even as defined by economists, seems
most problematic when an element of the crime itself is some kind of

93. Becker, supranote 3, at 170.
94. See id.
at 177. O is the number of offenses an actor will commit during a particular
period, pj is the probability of conviction per offense,4 is the punishment per offense, and uj
represents all other influences. See id.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26, 32.
96. Posner, supra note 4, at 1196, 1230.
97. See supratext accompanying notes 15-74.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
99. See supratext accompanying notes 47-57.
100. See WILSON, supra note 5, at 118.
101. See Veljanovski, supra note 52, at 163.
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irrationality-for example, second degree murder and manslaughter."°2 The
common law for these crimes requires that the offender have acted in the heat of
passion, before reason has had time to reassert itself. 3 These offenders would
have to be, by definition, "irrational actors"-for if one weighs the costs and
benefits of committing murder and then does in fact commit the murder, the
offender has committed first degree murder, not second degree murder or
manslaughter. Like the assumption of deterrence, the "rational actor" assumption
makes it difficult for law and economics scholars to produce sound theories about
the criminal law.
3. Universality
As one law and economics scholar has stated, "We all crave simple
elegance."' '° In any field, law and economics scholars attempt to create an
overarching theory that explains everything (whether elegant or not). The
economic analysis of criminal law is no different. "[E]conomists are saying that
most concepts taught by schools of criminology are irrelevant .... They now
contend . . . that their explanation of criminal behavior is superior to
psychological or sociological explanations."' 5 Posner, for one, asserts that the
economic analysis
is the proper positive analysis for criminal law, superior to the
"moral" theory. 0 6
A similar, though analytically distinct, aspect of this principle of universality
is that scholars usually do not distinguish among the different categories of crime;
or even if they do so nominally, ultimately treat all crime identically under their
models. Becker, for instance, claims that his analysis could be applied
indiscriminately across the gamut of crimes, including murder, robbery, assault,
tax evasion, white-collar crimes, and traffic and other violations.'0 7 Posner, on the
other hand, initially divides crime into different categories, seeming to recognize
that different categories of crime need to be analyzed separately.' 8 However,
Posner ultimately treats all crime as a pure economic problem, using his model
to explain how the criminal sanction can be used to avoid the circumvention of
market transactions. 0 9

102. Shavell, steadfastly insisting that deterrence is the only justification for punishment of
these crimes, views such punishment as an anomaly caused by imperfect information. Shavell,
supra note 31, at 1242-43. Instead, they should be analyzed, as I have suggested, as crimes
whose purpose is something other than general deterrence.
103. For an example of the codification of these crimes, see MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2-.3
(1962).
104. Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence'sDifficulty, 95 Micii. L. REv. 2385, 2386 (1997).
105. Sullivan, supranote 53, at 139.
106. Posner, supra note 4, at 1230-31.
107. Becker, supra note 3, at 170.
108. Posner, supra note 4, at 1199-1200, 1215-16.
109. One notable exception is so-called "victimless crimes," that involve voluntary transfers,
which Posner admits may not be substantially explained through economic analysis. Id. at
1200. However, he quickly retreats from this position, suggesting a possible economic
explanation--that such crimes cause disutility to highly moral people who are pained by the
mere existence of such acts. See id
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This approach of seeking a "one-size-fits-all" solution typifies law and
economics scholarship. It is particularly troubling in the analysis of criminal law,
however, because of the complicated history of this body of law, and its many
varied justifications and goals." 0 A superior alternative to grouping all crimes
together in a vain attempt to derive a simple, universal model, lies in recognizing
the limitations of the economic model and supplementing it with other
approaches."'
4. Preferences-Exogenous or Endogenous?
Normally, economists assume that preferences are exogenous-people's tastes
are not affected by public policy."' However, Dau-Schmidt suggests that
preferences should be treated as endogenous."' The criminal law, according to
Dau-Schmidt, is designed to shape preferences. Society will impose criminal
sanctions that shape not just opportunities, but preferences themselves, whenever
it is efficient to do so." 4 In addition to distinguishing criminal from tort law,"'
his model also attempts to address areas of the criminal law that many law and
economics scholars have found perplexing: inchoate crimes and intent." 6
Although this approach may be seen as a departure from the conventional
approach of law and economics scholars writing on crime and punishment," 7 it
might be more properly seen as an attempt to salvage most of the economic
model, and to engender a more widespread acceptance of the economic analysis
of criminal law."' Most of the other assumptions of an economic analysis remain
intact-importantly, Dau-Schmidt does not seem to question that the primary
purpose of the criminal law is to deter criminal behavior." 9 The question, for
purposes of this Note, is whether Dau-Schmidt's view of the criminal law as a
preference-shaping device resolves all of the deficiencies of an economic
approach to crime and punishment, or whether something more is needed.

110. See supraPart .
111. This is the reasoning behind Professor Dau-Schmidt's departure from the traditional
assumption of exogenous preferences; he desires to use the disciplines of sociology and
psychiatry to supplement the understanding of the economic analysis. Dau-Schmidt, supranote
4, at 15-16 & n.76, 17.
112. See POLINSKY, supra note 41, at 10.
113. Dau-Schmidt, supranote 4, at 24.
114. See id. at5.
115. See id. at 35.
116. See id. at 25-31.
117. See DAU-SCHMIDT & ULEN, supranote *, at 454, 468.
118. See Dau-Schmidt, supranote 4, at 2; Klevorick, supra note 2, at 290.
119. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 4. Professor Dau-Schmidt's article, like other law and
economics analyses of criminal law, seems to suggest that the main purpose of the criminal law
is general deterrence; the only difference between Professor Dau-Schmidt's work and those
"traditional" economic analyses regarding this assumption is the proposed manner in which
people are supposedly deterred from criminal activity. Another assumption, however, that DauSchmidt seems to reject is that of universality. He has personally suggested to me that his
preference-shaping analysis may well fit into the framework I have set forth infra, in Part III,
for certain categories of crime.
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One means of approaching this problem is to question the viability of DauSchmidt's assertion that the criminal law can properly be seen as a device to
shape societal preferences. As an initial matter, it seems obvious that criminal law
must shape preferences to some extent. Arguably, when one is first born into
society, one has no preferences. The great body of laws, mores, and all other
bands of society created over the millennia inevitably shape preferences. DanSchmidt seems to argue that given this initial allocation of preferences, a
legislative body intends to further mold societal preferences whenever it enacts
a law with a sanction that involves pain, isolation, or moral condemnation. 2 ° To
do so, according to Dau-Schmidt, is more efficient than to discourage the action
merely through tort law.'
This view is subject to a number of criticisms. First, such blatant social
engineering and wholesale encroachment upon free will is a bleak view of the role
and practice of legislatures." Secondly, a good majority of criminal laws passed
seem to reflect existing societal norms. If societal preferences are opposed to
murder or marijuana use, then the preference-shaping hypothesis would suggest
that there is no need to outlaw these practices. Third, there are numerous
examples of criminal laws that have been ignored by a substantial number in the
populace, and have subsequently been repealed. For example, the familiar failure
of Prohibition" suggests that the imposition of criminal sanctions does not shape
preferences, at least in some instances. Additionally, some criminal laws, while
not technically repealed, either fall into desuetude or are substantially ignored by
the populace, regardless of criminal consequences. For example, marijuana
possession is illegal, but the use of marijuana has not significantly decreased as
a result of its illegal nature. 24 Again, this suggests that for some types of crime
at least, the purpose of the criminal law is not to shape preferences (or,

120. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 4, at 15-20.
121. Id.
122. Dau-Schmidt recognizes this criticism, but, in my opinion, dismisses it too quickly. Id.
at 20 & n.98.
123. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
124. After an initial decrease when first outlawed in the 1930s, marijuana use has fluctuated,
with a sharp rise in use throughout the 1960s up until the 1980s, and a gradual decline since
then among the general population (though use among high school students has increased since
the 1980s). See Abbie Crites-Leoni, Medicinal Use of Mariuana:Is the Debate a Smoke
Screenfor Movement TowardLegalization?, 19 J.LEGAL MED. 273, 275 (1998). What purpose
do laws such as these serve? If they are ignored and rarely enforced, they cannot serve any of
the goals of general or specific deterrence, or revenge. Perhaps they are passed not to reform
society's morals, or accomplish any of the traditional goals of criminal law, but rather to ease
our social conscience.
An example even more striking than laws prohibiting marijuana use is that of certain laws
outlawing use of peyote, even for religious purposes. For example, the dissent to a recent
Supreme Court case upholding the validity of such a law cited evidence that the state never
made "significant enforcement efforts against... religious users of peyote," and that the law
"amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition." Employment Div.,
dissenting)
Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 911 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
(footnote omitted).
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coincidentally, to deter by any means), and that criminal law therefore serves
some other purpose.
Dau-Schmidt's analysis, then, does not provide a complete answer in its attempt
to explain the existence of the criminal law from an economic standpoint. Perhaps
Dau-Schmidt is correct that for certain categories of crimes, an element of
preference-shaping is present in the legislative intent; however, his model
ultimately fails as a complete explanation for one of the same reasons that other
economic models of crime and punishment fail: it does not account for the
competing justifications for criminal law that scholars have traditionally
discussed. However, it does depart from the assumption of universality somewhat,
drawing the distinction between "malum prohibitum" and "malum in se"
crimes. 125
III. SUGGESTIONS TO LAW AND ECONOMICS SCHOLARS

What then, is the role reserved for law and economics scholarship in the
analysis of criminal law? I propose that, depending on the category of crime at
issue, the usefulness of an economic approach will vary. While the five mentioned
justifications for punishment (deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, revenge,
and proportionality) can be found in most crimes to some extent, these
26
justifications are implicated differently, depending on the category of crime.'
Since the economic analysis of crime and punishment presumes deterrence to be
the central justification for any crime, an economic analysis will be the most
predictive and descriptive of those categories of crime in which the theory of
deterrence does in fact play a greater role. Many authors engaged in the economic
analysis of the criminal law endeavor to delineate crimes to a certain extent; yet
in the end these delineations serve no real purpose, as the categories are treated
quite similarly.
The two basic categories of crime proposed for analysis in this Note are
"malum prohibitum" and "malum in se" crimes. Malum prohibitum crimes are
further divided into "social torts" and "paternalistic" crimes; and malum in se
crimes are divided into the categories of "crimes against property," "crimes
against persons," and "inchoate crimes." Each category of crime implicates

125. Dau-Schmidt, supranote 4, at 36 n.189.
126. It has been suggested that incapacitation is an element that is person-specific, not crimespecific. See, e.g., GREENWOOD, supra note 54, at 50. As Wilson has noted, "most street
criminals do not specialize. Today's robber can be tomorrow's burglar and the next day's car
thief." WILsON, supra note 5, at 154. However, there is some evidence of certain recidivism
rates for various categories of crime. For example, Beck and Shipley's study found that
"[r]eleased prisoners were often re-arrested for the same type of crime for which they had
served time in prison." BECK & SHIPLEY, supra note 51, at 6. The study found that such rates
for various types of crime included the following: Homicide-6.6%; Rape-7.7%;
Robbery-19.6%; Assault-21.9%; Burglary-31.9%; Larceny/Theft-33.5%; and Public
Order Offenses-33.7%. See id Thus, with the proper classifications of crime, generalizations
about the recidivism rates can be drawn-as the level of violence decreases and the focus
moves from crimes against the person to property crimes, the recidivism rate increases.
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different values and different justifications for punishment. Therefore, the
usefulness of an economic analysis will vary according to the category of crime.
A. Model-Values as They Relate to Specific Types of
Crimes
Proportionality will always play a role in determining punishment, regardless
of the type of crime-the punishment should always fit the crime. Concerns of
general deterrence will also almost always be present (though not to the extent
that economists would have us believe), except for those categories of crimes for
which general deterrence has proven to be ineffective.'27 Furthermore, multiple
justifications for punishment may be found relevant to a single category of crime.
When more than one justification is present, the impact on deterrence will be
proportionately less, and the predictive power of an economic model will be
accordingly less.
While the justifications of proportionality and general deterrence will remain
fairly constant for most categories of crime, the other justifications will vary
broadly with the level of violence present in the type of crime. Depending upon
this level of violence, the primary justification for punishment for any given
crime will be some kind of specific deterrence (rehabilitation if the crime is not
too violent and the recidivism rate is at a moderate level, and incapacitation if the
level of violence or recidivism is very high) or revenge, or both.' 28
In analyzing the presence of the various justifications for punishment for the
different categories of crime, the effectiveness of Becker's social loss function
as a tool for determining the optimal level of crime and allocation of resources
can be predicted. 29 Becker's function will be most useful for those crimes which
may hold some value to society, and for which general deterrence plays a
prominent role as a justification for punishment. However, when revenge takes
precedence as ajustification for punishment, Becker's model will become less
useful. Murder, for example, does not lend itself to the social loss
function-because of the great desire for revenge, society arguably hopes to
allocate as many resources as possible in an attempt to catch every single
murderer. Whereas a social loss function hypothesizing general deterrence as the
main justification for any crime would predict that a relatively low number of
offenders be punished, as long as the punishment were sufficiently stringent. 3

127. Some common examples are narcotics trafficking, prostitution, and organized crime.
For such crimes, new criminals automatically emerge as quickly as the old ones are
incarcerated. See WILSON, supra note 5, at 146. Additionally, certain types of crimes are
"undeterrable" because of the elements of the crime. See Shavell, supranote 31, at 1242-44.
128. The US.Sentencing Commission GuidelinesManual,for instance, suggests that crimes
with higher recidivism rates indicate a greater need for incapacitation, and a lesser likelihood
of rehabilitation. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GumELnES MANUAL 283 (1997)
(Introductory Commentary to ch. 4, pt. A) [hereinafter MANuAL].
129. Becker, supranote 3.
130. See id. at 180.
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1. Malum Prohibitum Crimes
Literally, "malum prohibitum" means wrong only because prohibited (by law),
while "malum in se," discussed in the following section, means wrong in and of
itself.' However, these phrases have evolved into "terms of art" with precise
definitions for some purposes. For the limited purposes of this Note, these terms
will be used according to the more literal meanings. I have divided malum
prohibitum crimes into two categories for analysis: "social torts" and
"paternalistic crimes."'32
a. Social Torts
For social torts, which include such "crimes" as parking violations, the only
real concern besides proportionality is that of general deterrence. Since society
places some value on such acts as parking violators' "crimes,' 3 3 one would
predict Becker's social loss function to be extremely useful for these crimes.
Indeed, the example of parking violations used by Polinsky3 4 to illustrate
Becker's model 3 demonstrates that the model was virtually designed for social
torts. That is, there truly can be an "optimal" level of crime that is greater than
zero, since there is no element of revenge present for social torts, and since some
commission 6of torts have utility for society, and not just for the individual
3
perpetrator.
b. Paternalistic Crimes
This second category of malum prohibitum crimes includes such crimes as
prostitution, gambling, and drug and alcohol use. 137 Often such crimes involve the
state simply outlawing consensual transactions, which economists generally

131. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959-60 (6th ed. 1990).

132. This definition of"malum prohibitum" seems to be intuitively appealing. It is difficult
to argue that the commission of a social tort, such as a parking violation or traffic law, is
malum in se (wrong in itself). Furthermore, though they may be more difficult to defend,
"paternalistic crimes" such as laws against alcohol, drugs, gambling, and prostitution do not
seem to be inherently wrong, as they involve consensual transactions and do not have any
external costs. At the least, these crimes are more morally ambiguous than are crimes such as
murder. As is evident, even when trying to give these terms their "literal" meaning, lines must
be drawn, and such lines cannot always be drawn without a pang of conscience.
133. See POLINSKY, supra note 41, at 75-86; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 4, at 15-20. As an
example, consider a father hurrying to the pharmacy to fill a prescription for his sick infant.
Parking in an illegal zone outside the pharmacy may be useful to society, and even worth the
fine.
134. POLINSKY, supranote 41, at 75-86.
135. See id at 86.

136. See supratext accompanying note 81.
137. For simplification, "serious" drug crimes will not be treated here.
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believe should be unfettered by state interference.' 38 For these crimes, the
mechanism of general deterrence operates to a lesser extent than it does for social
torts. To ease our social conscience, we sometimes flex our paternalistic
muscle, 39 but our fickle conscience does not seem to allow us to flex too much.
Of the other potential justifications for punishment, it seems clear that
incapacitation plays virtually no role, 4 ' but that rehabilitation may indeed be
present.'41 Revenge is not a factor, since there are no victims. 142 One would
predict that Becker's social loss function would be very helpful in analyzing such
crimes; since the general deterrent element is present, no element of revenge is
present, and the proscribed acts may have some societal value and may thus be
encouraged in certain instances. 43 The two factors that detract from the function's
usefulness are the presence of elements of incapacitation and rehabilitation
deterrence),' 44 and the
(which may interfere somewhat with the process of4general
5
crimes.
such
of
halfhearted pursuit of deterrence
2. Malum In Se Crimes
The categories of property crimes and crimes against the person which I have
chosen may be seen as largely arbitrary,'4 6 and better and further classifications
can certainly be made. 47 However, these categories seem to correlate with factors
138. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1200. Posner himself believes that marijuana should be
legalized. See Tony Mauro, Legalize Mariuana ProminentJuristSays, USA TODAY, Sept. 14,
1995, atA2.
139. See supratext accompanying note 124.
140. Even though recidivism rates for such crimes may be high, suggesting a need for
incapacitation, to lock up offenders for such relatively minor offenses would be a waste of
resources, because it probably would not reduce the crime rate significantly for such crimes.
See ZIMRNG & HAwKiNs, supra note 54, at 63.
141. To make this claim, the category must be further divided. It is doubtful that offenders
of certain paternalistic crimes would be reformed by ajail term. However, a penal sentence of
professional counseling could be employed to attempt to reform the offenders. For some types
of crimes in this category, such as prostitution and bribery, the traditional theory of
rehabilitation through penal servitude may apply; of course, the effectiveness of such methods
of reformation have been questioned. At any rate, for any theory of rehabilitation to be
effective, jails must not be "schools of crime." WILSON, supra note 5, at 146.
142. Although it may be argued that the people who are upset by seeing the prohibited acts
occur are the victims. See Posner, supranote 4, at 1200-01.
143. One example of such a crime that might have societal value is the religious use of
peyote for sacramental purposes in the Native American Church. See Employment Div., Dept.
of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 47-57.
145. That is, since we cannot decide whether some of these acts are truly wrong, we are not
sure whether we should enforce a criminal sanction, and thus discourage the commission of
those acts. See supratext accompanying note 124.
146. Actually, they are borrowed from Becker. See Becker, supra note 3, at 171
(incorporating a table citing as its source the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice (1967)).
147. There will be considerable overlap between the categories, based on the level of
severity of the crime. Beck & Shipley, for instance, divide crimes into "violent offenses,"
which include homicide, rape, robbery, and assault, and "property offenses," which include
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that have a bearing on which justifications for punishment are present in any
particular crime. For example, whether the crime was committed against the
person, or was merely a property crime, appears to have a bearing on a need for
revenge associated with that crime. Furthermore, crimes against the person have
relatively low recidivism rates. 49 Recidivism rates for the crime are indicators of
whether the goal of punishment should be incapacitation or rehabilitation.'4 9
a. Property Crimes
Property crimes include not only crimes committed against property, such as
arson and vandalism, but also such crimes as burglary and unarmed robbery.
While extremely violent property crimes are committed, these crimes are usually
not capable of inflicting as much damage as are crimes against the person. 50 Even
as compared to less violent crimes against persons, having the physical person
violated is often more offensive than having property taken or destroyed.'
Accordingly, one would expect the need for revenge to be somewhat less for
crimes against property than for crimes against the person. Regardless, the need
for revenge in punishing perpetrators of crimes against property is much greater
than the corresponding need regarding malum prohibitum crimes.
The other factor to consider is recidivism. Generally, recidivism rates for
property are somewhat higher than crimes against the person.' 52 The higher the
recidivism rate, the greater the need for incapacitation, and the lower the chance
of rehabilitation.' 53 Because incapacitation and revenge play a substantial role in
crimes against property, the competing role of general deterrence is
proportionately less than the role of general deterrence in malum prohibitum
crimes, where it is an overriding concern. 5 4 Therefore, Becker's model will be
less effective in describing these crimes than malum prohibitum crimes.

burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and fraud. BECK & SHIPLEY, supra note 51, at 6. I have
chosen the categories of "crimes against the person" and "property crimes" because the
recidivism rates, which bear upon rehabilitation and incapacitation, see supra note 128, seem
to be more closely grouped under my classification. Additionally, the need for revenge may
be greater in regard to crimes against the person (though, clearly, the level of violence probably
also closely correlates to the need for revenge).
148. See BECK & SHIPLEY, supranote 51, at 6.
149. See supranote 128.
150. Despite attempts to value a life for purposes of tort law, see generally Steven E.
Rhoads, How Much Should We Spend to Save a Life?, 51 PUB. INTEREsT 74 (1978), it is
obvious that no amount of money will induce a voluntary exchange of money for life ex ante,
while the same is not true for property, see Posner, supra note 4, at 1202.
151. See Thomas Bak, Does the Offense ChargedPredict the Type and Frequency of
Pretrial Violations?, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRiM.& CIV. CONFINEMENT 65, 75 (1998) (citing

"societal notions that crimes against property are less heinous than crimes against persons").
152. See BECK & SHIPLEY, supranote 51, at 6. Violent crimes against the person, such as
murder and rape, have-extremely low recidivism rates compared to property crimes such as
burglary and larceny. See id.
153. See supra note 128.
154. See supratext accompanying notes 47-53.
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Furthermore, since these crimes have little or no social value,' Becker's social
loss function becomes even less valuable for this category of crime.
b. Crimes Against the Person
Crimes against the person include extremely violent crimes such as murder and
rape, as well as the somewhat less violent crimes of armed robbery and assault.
Since these crimes are more violent than any other category," 6 a need for revenge
ascends to primacy, and will outweigh general deterrence by a great deal.
Incapacitation and rehabilitation may also play minor roles,5 7 but the need for
revenge, especially as the crimes become more violent, is the overriding factor.
To satiate the need for revenge, society desires to catch all of the perpetrators of
violent crimes against persons if it can, and will therefore allocate more resources
for apprehension of those perpetrators than it will to catch perpetrators of other
crimes. Consequently, Becker's analysis will be least useful for this category of
crime.
3. Inchoate Crimes
Thie final category is that of inchoate crimes, which include solicitation,
attempt, and conspiracy. These crimes comprise a separate category in this model
since law and economics scholars have struggled so much with this category of
crime. ' 8 Indeed, it seems difficult to explain. On the one hand general deterrence
would not seem to be a principal justification for punishing inchoate
crimes-after all, is there really any need to deter actions that turn out to be
harmless? However, viewed through a different lens, general deterrence can be
seen as the foremost justification in punishing attempts and conspiracies-not to
achieve deterrence of a harmless act, but rather deterrence of the completed
crime.
On the other hand, the need for revenge is in fact low for such crimes. When
there is no "real harm" and no victim, the need for revenge simply does not arise.
Therefore, one would predict that Becker's model would be highly predictive for
this category of crimes. Accordingly, to successfully deter such crimes, penalties

155. It has been argued that in some cases, theft is desirable, such as when a starving person
steals a slice of bread. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1230. However, these instances are better
categorized as not criminal at all. Because of the defense of necessity, there will be no
punishment. With no potential ill consequences, there is no cost to weigh against the benefit
of staving off starvation.
156. As has been stated, some crimes against property are more violent than crimes against
persons. In those cases, the model may be adjusted accordingly.
157. Because of the relatively low recidivism rates for these crimes, see supra note 126, one
might predict that the need for incapacitation is lower and the need for rehabilitation is higher
for these crimes. See MANUAL, supra note 128, at 283. However, because of the overriding
need for revenge, especially in cases of murder, this may not be the case. Furthermore, in cases
of sex crimes, society has in some cases decided that sex offenders are akin to mentally ill
people who need to be incapacitated for the protection of society, and have little hope of
rehabilitation. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 348 (1997).
158. See Dau-Schmidt, supranote 4, at 2, 28.
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should be made artificially high in relation to the individual harm suffered as a
result of the crime.'59 Perhaps this explains why the penalties for inchoate crimes
are the same as the penalties for the corresponding "choate" crimes, 6 ° even
though the harm done by inchoate crimes is much less.
CONCLUSION

Professor Coleman argues that an economic approach to crime and punishment
is fundamentally implausible because of the strong element of desert present in
criminal punishment. He contrasts crime against tort, where economic analysis
has been more successful, because tort involves simpler questions of efficient
allocation of loss:
[I]n crimes the question is whether the state has a right to deprive a particular
person of his liberty by incarcerating him. In torts, it is whether a state has
sufficient grounds for shifting a loss from the party upon whom it has initially
fallen to another individual, when the loss must fall on one or the other of
them. In [crimes],
the state must be satisfied that the individual deserves to
be punished. 6'
Coleman further argues that this difference between tort and criminal law is the
defining element of criminal law-that when the state strips a party of the
fundamental right to liberty, the state must be sure that the party deserves
62
punishment.
I agree with Coleman that desert, or retributivism, is an important element in
defining the need for the criminal law and punishment. Furthermore, I postulate
that economic theories of crime have been relatively unsuccessful because they
have largely ignored the retributivist elements in crime and punishment. Criminal
law is enacted by and for the benefit of people, most of whom have not
"transcended" that need for some kind of revenge or reckoning after they have
been wronged.
As I was watching the evening news, I happened to see a report regarding the
verdict in the trial of Terry Nichols (in connection with the Oklahoma City
bombing). 63 I was struck by the comments of a victim's relative. She was utterly
disgusted that Nichols had "gotten off' with involuntary manslaughter, and had
been acquitted of murder. To me, at least, it seems unlikely that this woman was
so upset because she felt that the mechanism of general deterrence was not
working. It seems more likely that her need for revenge had been frustrated.
Still, retributivism is not the entire story-utilitarian elements also pervade the
criminal law. The abundance of crimes, categories of crime, and purposes behind
the criminal law indicate that any one positive theory of crime and punishment is
inadequate. The interplay between competing theories is a part of what makes the

159. See Becker, supranote 3, at 176-79.
160. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (1962).
161. Coleman, supra note 2, at 326 (emphasis in original). Notice, however, that Coleman's
analysis does not account for those crimes in which the state deprives a person of the
fundamental right to property.
162. Id.
163. See supranote 14.
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study of criminal law so engaging. An economic analysis of crime and
punishment, while useful to an extent (and very useful in explaining certain
categories of crime), is not the authoritative positive model that some would have
it be. An attempt to explain the entire body of criminal law under an economic
analysis is fruitless.

